There has been a recent trend toward activist short selling. Rather than shorting stocks simply because they are overvalued, activist short sellers focus on corporate fraud.
The activist short sellers are a mixture of well-known activist investors and firms, such as Muddy Waters Research, Citron Research, and Hindenburg Research, led by investors Carson Block, Andrew Left, and Nathan Anderson. These firms profit by identifying companies engaging in fraud, taking short positions in those companies, publishing their investigations, and then closing their short positions after those companies’ stock prices decline in response to their investigations. This is entirely legal, as long as what they publish is not fraudulent.
These passionate fraud busters stand on the shoulders of James Chanos, the legendary short seller known for his bearish bets against Enron and Tesla. This group of activist shorts is united by a deep conviction that just about everyone else is either corrupt or clueless. Block, for example, decorated an office bathroom of his Muddy Waters headquarters with a poster bearing the letterhead of the consulting giant McKinsey & Company.[1] Chanos refers to himself as a “real-time financial detective who is incentivized to root out fraud.” Or, more prosaically, a “forensic financial statement junkie.”[2] His pitch is that he can identify corporate disasters-in-the-making. Anderson prefers to think of himself as a private detective, identifying corporate fraud that might otherwise go undetected by snoozing regulators. “The scale of fraud is quite massive. I don’t think any system can sustain itself with that scale of grifts happening,” Anderson says.[3]
Not surprisingly, activist shorts are largely viewed by corporate America as a blight on the market. Elon Musk, for example, has fought a long-running battle against short sellers, saying that “short selling should be illegal.” Moreover, short sellers frequently face regulatory scrutiny from the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The DOJ and the SEC launched a wide-ranging investigation into short selling in 2021, including the relationships between hedge funds and researchers.
Short selling is a highly risky endeavor: short sellers are exposed to substantial undiversified risk, often pay substantial fees to borrow stock, face the prospect of retaliation by powerful corporations, and insolvency on their short.
It is worth reiterating how often short sellers have performed a public service in drawing attention to companies involved in fraudulent activity. In the case of Enron or Tyco, shorts were vilified but proved to be wholly right, while most Wall Street analysts kept buy ratings on the stocks until the very moment of bankruptcy. Shorts warned investors about the 2008 crisis and ended up being immortalized in the book and the movie The Big Short.
Activist short sellers play a quasi-journalistic function and add significant value to the securities markets. Financial economists are generally of the view that short selling is highly beneficial. Short selling helps make stock prices more accurate. Bans on short selling are associated with higher bid-ask spreads, increased stock price volatility, and slower price discovery, leading to skewed market efficiency. Securities litigation jurisprudence has recognized that short seller activity is indicative of market efficiency; in particular, courts rely on short seller activity to assess whether a stock trades in an efficient market when assessing motions for class certification.[4] Moreover, short selling prevents stock price “bubbles” and other overvaluations in securities prices. Owen A. Lamont, a finance professor at the Yale School of Management, studied a group of companies that battled with short sellers and found that those companies’ share prices fell 42 percent on average over the next three years, suggesting their share prices were inflated, just as the shorts had claimed.[5]
According to finance professors, the average short seller has done well through astute research and analysis, not market manipulation. Because the views of short sellers tend to run counter to the consensus, long-only perspective, short sellers require particularly robust analysis and confidence in reaching their conclusions. Thus, they often serve as an important source of independent, diligent, and detailed research. Anderson, for example, has submitted Hindenburg’s report investigating a Ponzi scheme at investing firm J&J for consideration for the Pulitzer Prize in investigative journalism.
Hindenburg can take six months or more to produce a research report. “The industry is far more mundane than most people realize. It’s really a lot of reading filings, speaking to industry sources, and long-form research,” Anderson says. Left said in 2015: “Wall Street research is painfully boring. I enjoy being entertaining.”
Today, Chanos says, “we are in the golden age of fraud.” Chanos describes the current environment as “a really fertile field for people to play false and loose with the truth, and for corporate wrongdoers to get away with it for a long time.” He explains why: a level of retail participation in the markets reminiscent of the end of the dotcom boom; Trumpian “post-truth in politics”; and Silicon Valley’s “fake it until you make it” culture, which is compounded by Fomo — the fear of missing out. All of this is exacerbated by lax oversight. Financial regulators and law enforcement, he says, “are the financial archaeologists — they will tell you after the company has collapsed what the problem was.” Thus, Chanos believes that “this market is setting up to be one of the great short opportunities of all time.”[6]
As activism of short sellers becomes more prominent, short seller reports have played an increasingly prominent role in securities class actions, and plaintiffs’ attorneys often rely on such reports in their pleadings to serve as corrective disclosures.[7] The activist short sellers’ reports are a key event in establishing loss causation and damages, and an analysis of stock returns surrounding short seller reports helps lawyers filter the most meritorious cases.[8] For example, Citron Research’s investigation of systemic price gouging at Valeant Pharmaceuticals resulted in a class action suit from its shareholders that ultimately settled for $1.21 billion.[9]
When plaintiff-side securities law firms analyze short seller reports, these firms focus on the strength of the evidence cited in these reports. Strong evidence includes interviews with industry sources, analysis from relevant experts, accounting analysis that points to indicia of false financial statements, reliable tests performed on products, and evidence of problems at company facilities.
Such evidence is more likely to introduce new, reliable information to the market and be useful to investors in a potential securities class action. Weaker short seller reports, on the other hand, provide only shallow background research and often reiterate public information. Although not every short seller report presents sufficient signs of fraud, the plaintiff-side securities law firms are ready to team up with Wall Street’s Short Kings – the activist short sellers.
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[1] Evan Hughes, The Man Who Moves Markets, The Atlantic (Feb. 2, 2023), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/03/wall-street-muddy-waters-activist-short-sellers-tesla-gamestop/672774/.
[2] Harriet Agnew, Jim Chanos: “We are in the golden age of fraud,” Fin. Times (July 24, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ccb46309-bba4-4fb7-b3fa-ecb17ea0e9cf.
[3] Andrew Rice, Nathan Anderson’s Precarious Short-Selling Enterprise, N.Y. Mag. (Jan. 20, 2022), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2022/01/nathan-anderson-hindenburg-research-short-selling.html.
[4] See, e.g., In re Teva Sec. Litig., 2021 WL 872156, at *1, *14 (D. Conn. Mar. 9, 2021) (noting in a ruling on class certification that “[t]he number of arbitrageurs holding short positions . . . varied substantially month-to-month” which “supports the conclusion that investors were able to, and did, take and change positions . . . to reflect their views, the core mechanism by which financial markets are driven to efficiency”).
[5] Jenny Anderson, A New Wave of Vilifying Short Sellers, N.Y. Times (Apr. 30, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30shorts.html.
[6] Harriet Agnew, Jim Chanos: “We are in the golden age of fraud,” Fin. Times (July 24, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ccb46309-bba4-4fb7-b3fa-ecb17ea0e9cf.
[7] Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, The Long-Term Effects of Short Selling and Negative Activism, 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 14, 32 (2021) (finding eighty-four securities class actions that relied on short-seller reports from 2009 to 2016); Nessim Mezrahi, Stephen Sigrist & Carolina Doherty, More Securities Class Actions May Rely on Short-Seller Data, Law360 (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.law360.com/securities/articles/1453499/ (stating that, in 2021, “[a]round 21%, or 27 of 131, of fraud-on-the-market securities class actions rel[ied] on short-seller research that affected the price of common stock of the defendant company”).
[8] Lea v. TAL Education Group, 837 F. App’x 20, 28 (2d Cir. 2020) (“In short, the stock value loss following the disclosure of such information in the Muddy Waters report is sufficient at this stage to plead loss causation as to each of the claims.”).
[9] Bausch Health Agrees to Pay $1.21 Billion to Settle Share Price Lawsuit, Reuters (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bausch-health-litigation/bausch-health-agrees-to-pay-1-21-billion-to-settle-share-price-lawsuit-idUSKBN1YK163; see also In re: Luckin Coffee Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 20-cv-01293 (S.D.N.Y.) (resulting in a $175 million settlement for shareholders); City of Sunrise General Employees’ Retirement Plan v. Fleetcor Technologies, Inc., No. 17-cv-02207 (N.D. Ga.) (resulting in a $50 million settlement for shareholders); Keippel v. Health Insurance Innovations, Inc., No. 19-cv-00421 (M.D. Fla.) (resulting in an $11 million settlement for shareholders).
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About Dolgora Dorzhieva
Dolgora Dorzhieva is an associate in the New York office of Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP and focuses her practice on securities litigation.
Dolgora Dorzhieva
Associate at Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP
New York office
Tel: (212) 983-9330
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E-mail: ddorzhieva@faruqilaw.com
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